Nova Law Review
Volume 41, Issue 3

2017

Article 7

Cardiac Defibrillators Need To Have A
Bulletproof Vest: The National Security Risk
Posed By The Lack Of Cybersecurity In
Implantable Medical Devices
Michael Woods∗

∗

Copyright c 2017 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr

Cardiac Defibrillators Need To Have A
Bulletproof Vest: The National Security Risk
Posed By The Lack Of Cybersecurity In
Implantable Medical Devices
Michael Woods

Abstract
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before, drops dead after his implanted medical device turns seemingly against him.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a world where a patient wearing a pacemaker or an insulin
pump, just fine moments before, drops dead after his implanted medical
device turns seemingly against him.1 Worse yet, imagine that an insulin
*.
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1.
See Homeland Security Investigating Medical Device Cybersecurity,
IHEALTHBEAT
(Oct.
23,
2014),
http://web.archive.org/web/20141028015215/http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2014/10/23/h
omeland-security-investigating-medical-device-cybersecurity.
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pump is giving false readings and a user relying on the readings injects too
much insulin, thus being the instrument in his or her own demise.2 These
examples can be the work of malicious actors who hack into implanted
medical devices, which has been possible for years.3 The federal
government has done little to regulate any type of cybersecurity on
implantable medical devices, despite knowing that hacking these devices has
been possible for almost a decade.4 The number of patients with implanted
medical devices is not miniscule either; millions of people in the United
States already have implanted medical devices, and roughly 300,000 new
people are getting them each year.5 The implantable medical device “market
is projected to be around [seventeen] [b]illion dollars by 2019,” resulting in a
large population of patients with this technology in them and little to no
cybersecurity attached to those devices, which is a huge security risk.6
Considering that “[t]he U[nited] S[tates] Department of Homeland Security
has identified the . . . Public Health sector as . . . [a] critical cyber security
infrastructure[]” to the United States, this lack of cybersecurity is a huge
national security risk.7
This Article analyzes the vulnerabilities of implantable medical
devices, such as pacemakers/defibrillators and insulin pumps, to hacking by
malicious actors and the national security risk that those vulnerabilities
pose.8 Part II will explain the lack of cybersecurity of implantable medical
devices, such as cardiac defibrillators and insulin pumps, and the
vulnerabilities of implantable medical devices to cyberattacks that will harm
2.
Benjamin Ransford et al., Design Challenges for Secure Implantable
Medical Devises, in SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES 157, 164
(Wayne Burleson & Sandro Carrara eds., 2014); see also Homeland Security Investigating
Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra note 1.
3.
Homeland Security Investigating Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra
note 1. “In 2007 . . . Vice President . . . Cheney had some of the wireless features on his
defibrillator disabled due to security concerns” that a terrorist group or an individual person
with a vendetta could hack into his defibrillator and use it to kill him. Id.
4.
See Mike Colias, Cyber Security, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, May 2004,
at 60, 62, 64; Homeland Security Investigating Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra note 1.
5.
Shyamnath Gollakota et al., They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: NonInvasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices, ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM.
REV., Aug. 2011, at 2.
6.
Apurva Mohan, Cyber Security for Personal Medical Devices Internet of
Things, in 2014 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING IN SENSOR
SYSTEMS 372, 372 (Lisa O’Conner ed., 2014).
7.
Nicholas J. Mankovich, Securing IT Networks Incorporating Medical
Devices: Risk Management and Compliance in Health Care Cyber Security, in ADVANCES IN
CYBER SECURITY: TECHNOLOGY, OPERATIONS, AND EXPERIENCES 173, 173 (D. Frank Hsu &
Dorothy Marinucci eds., 2013).
8.
See infra Parts II–IV.
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the patient.9 It will then emphasize how this is a national security risk by
providing instances of lack of cybersecurity causing harm in the United
States and abroad, which includes the research conducted in hacking
implantable medical devices.10
Part III will analyze the current
governmental legislation and regulations on implantable medical devices and
how the government fails to address cybersecurity due to conflicting laws
within agencies and branches of government.11 Part IV delves into possible
solutions for this national security risk by proposing possible governmental
regulations, as well as other private sector-led solutions.12 It will then
conclude by stressing the dangers that poor regulations and laws can cause
by failing to address the cybersecurity risks to the medical device industry.13
II.

UNDERSTANDING HACKING IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES

Manufacturers focus, first and foremost, on functionality of
implantable medical devices, and almost all manufacturers skip any type of
cybersecurity due to a multitude of reasons.14 As devices are increasingly
interconnected with the Internet and wireless functionalities, the lack of
cybersecurity poses a huge security risk to patients wearing implantable
medical devices from malicious actors.15 Part A discusses manufacturer
concerns about adding cybersecurity to implantable medical devices, and
explains how the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) echoes these
fears.16 It also highlights the lack of focus the healthcare industry has overall
in tackling cybersecurity issues.17 Part B examines the many ways hackers
can take over and manipulate implantable medical devices.18 Part C provides
examples of cyberattacks on medical devices across the United States and
overseas, and how preventative measures, such as anti-virus software,
contribute to the harm.19 Part C concludes by discussing laboratory
simulations and public demonstrations of hacking implantable medical

9.
See infra Part II.
10.
See infra Section II.C.
11.
See infra Part III.
12.
See infra Part IV.
13.
See infra Parts IV–V.
14.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 170.
15.
Mankovich, supra note 7, at 174–75; Homeland Security Investigating
Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra note 1.
16.
See infra Section II.A.
17.
See infra Section II.A.
18.
See infra Section II.B.
19.
See infra Section II.C.
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devices and demonstrating the clear and present threat the lack of
cybersecurity has on these devices.20
A.

The Lack of Cybersecurity: A Problem with the Industry

Implantable medical devices are, first and foremost, designed to
provide enormous health benefits to patients.21 These devices, such as
insulin pumps and cardiac defibrillators, all feature wireless communication
to monitor and treat patients through personalized care and send reports to
their physicians.22 They also are updated remotely with the latest firmware,
all for the benefit of the patient.23 As manufacturers keep improving quality
of care and technology by making the devices lighter, smaller, and faster,
they tend to ignore cybersecurity for the devices.24
Implantable medical devices do not have cybersecurity built into
them when they are made.25 This is due to a myriad of reasons: The
“limitations in computing power or memory space” from having such a small
device that is “[un]able to run traditional [anti-virus] software without
impacting [the device’s] performance;”26 fear of creating “a critical, lifethreatening situation if the system responds to a false positive if there is antivirus software in the medical device;27 standard security software is difficult
to use with the limited memory in a customized/scaled back version of the
operating system in the device;28 authentication security measures on the
devices risk patient safety in cases of an emergency when a medical
professional may need to disable or alter the device to treat a patient;29 and
20.
21.

See infra Section II.C.
Wayne Burleson & Sandro Carrara, Introduction to SECURITY AND
PRIVACY FOR IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES 1, 1 (Wayne Burleson & Sandro Carrara eds.,
2014).
22.
Sarbari Gupta, Implantable Medical Devices — Cyber Risks and
Mitigation Approaches, Abstract from the Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech.: Cybersecurity in
Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (Apr. 23, 2012).
23.
Id.
24.
Burleson & Carrara, supra note 21, at 1. This is according to Lessley
Stoltenberg, the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center’s Chief Information
Security Officer. Jim Finkle, U.S. Government Probes Medical Devices for Possible Cyber
Flaws, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2014, 7:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecuritymedicaldevices-insight-idUSKCN0IB0DQ20141022.
25.
Finkle, supra note 24.
26.
Axel Wirth, Cybercrimes Pose Growing Threat to Medical Devices, 45
BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION & TECH. 26, 31 (2011).
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 28.
29.
See Sharon R. Klein & Odia Kagan, Unhack My Heart: FDA Issues
Guidance to Mitigate Cybersecurity Threats in Medical Devices, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP 2
(June 24, 2013), http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/clientalert062413b.pdf.
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heavy encryption for security of the device may drain enough energy that it
would require frequent device replacement, which would require surgery,
resulting in burdening both the patient and the medical profession.30 The
FDA has echoed these fears of “medical device security measures doing
more harm than good in emergency situations.”31 Implantable medical
devices are meant to improve patients’ lives, and thus, manufacturers and
designers have apportioned this above all else to cybersecurity.32
The healthcare industry is estimated to be “‘five to seven years
behind’ other industries in . . . cybersecurity.”33 This is because the
healthcare industry is very diverse and fragmented compared to other
industries, such as the energy industry.34 Traditionally, “[t]he medical device
industry has . . . ignored warnings that its products [are not] protected against
[a] cyberattack.”35 If there is any type of security protection put into devices
by manufacturers, it tends to focus on data theft, not device manipulation by
malicious actors.36 Also, compared to other industries that spend 12% of
their information technology (“IT”) security budget on data protection alone,
a majority of healthcare organizations spend less than 3% of their IT security
budgets on it.37 With the percentage of healthcare organizations that have
reported being hacked rising from 20% in 2009 to 40% in 2013, the medical
industry’s dismal security budget focus and funding, compared to industry
standards of preventative IT security budget, could be considered negligent.38
“[Ninety-four percent] of [all] healthcare institutions [have] reported . . .
be[ing] victims of cyberattacks.”39
Lastly, there is not an effective national reporting system for
cybersecurity related failures that play a significant role in patient injuries or

30.
See Burleson & Carrara, supra note 21, at 4.
31.
Klein & Kagan, supra note 29, at 2.
32.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 170.
33.
Alex Ruoff, Security Exec: Medical Device Industry at Least Five Years
Behind on Cybersecurity, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 17, 17 (2014).
34.
Daniel J. Barnett et al., Cyber Security Threats to Public Health, 5 WORLD
MED. & HEALTH POL’Y 37, 38 (2013).
35.
Ruoff, supra note 33, at 17.
36.
Id.
37.
Alex Ruoff, Hacking Incidents on the Rise, But IT Security Budgets
Remain Low, Execs Say, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 20, 20 (2014).
38.
See Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record Is Worth More to
Hackers Than Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:24 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitals-idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924; Ruoff,
supra note 37, at 20.
39.
Eric D. Perakslis, Cybersecurity in Health Care, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED.
395, 395 (2014).
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deaths.40 “[A]pproximately 1.2 million adverse events of medical devices
were reported to the FDA’s Manufacturer and User Facility Device
Experience . . . database” between 2006 and 2011,41 but there is no
information on those cybersecurity related failures, as cybersecurity
problems are not included in the reporting system.42 Out of the 1.2 million,
23% were listed only as computer-related failures, 94% of which "presented
medium to high risk” of harm to the patient.43
Similarly, the FDA’s Manufacturer and User Facility Device
Experience “database is qualitative rather than quantitative,” and it does not
concern itself with security events.44 For example, if a clinician is using a
device that is slower because of a malware infection, it would most likely not
be reported.45 This is because admitting a role in infecting a medical device
or a network, such as inserting an infected flash drive in a computer or
connecting an infected phone to the network, would lead to disciplinary
action.46 Therefore, the actual number of what is reported is most likely low
because of employees not realizing an issue or fearing retribution.47
B.

The Digital Vulnerabilities of Implantable Medical Devices

Current implantable medical devices can be hacked into and taken
over, overloaded with malware to slow them down, turned off completely,
and overloaded to kill the host at the behest of a malicious actor or actors,
and all harming the host of the device.48 For instance, a Medtronic
pacemaker does not need a password to access the device and the wireless
communication is not encrypted, which makes it easy for a hacker to collect
data from the device, reverse engineer the protocol, and take over the
device.49 Public information, such as any implantable medical device user’s
manual and the specifications for the device’s radio chip, make the reverse
engineering and finding of the remote control personal identification number
40.
Kevin Fu & James Blum, Controlling for Cybersecurity Risks of Medical
Device Software, COMM. ACM, Oct. 2013, at 35, 35–36.
41.
Id. at 35.
42.
Id. at 35–36.
43.
Id. at 35.
44.
Id. at 36.
45.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36.
46.
Id.
47.
See id.
48.
See Steven J. Templeton, Security Aspects of Cyber-Physical Device
Safety in Assistive Environments, in PETRA 2011, THE 4TH ACM INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO ASSISTIVE ENVIRONMENTS, CRETE,
GREECE, MAY 25–27, 2011 §1, 2.1.1 (Ass’n for Computing Mach. 2011).
49.
Id.
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to control the device relatively simple.50 Once this is done with readily
available information, the hacker can generate misleading information, such
as false readings on an insulin pump or just cause it to inject “insulin into the
patient’s body.”51 Implantable medical devices are exposed to common
cyber threats that normal computers experience because the operating
system, central processing unit, and other software components are generally
off-the-shelf components.52 Medical devices still tend to rely on the original
versions of their operating system—such as Windows XP—even long after
support for the operating system has ended.53 Hackers can also take control
of the device as long as it is around any sort of wireless Internet, and the
strength of the transmission and radio frequency of the implantable medical
device does not matter.54 This is possible because Federal Communications
Commission regulations make it so that implanted medical devices have a
certain radio frequency range, as implantable medical devices “[do] not
normally initiate communication [and only] transmit [as a] response to a
transmission from [another party] or if [they] detect[] a life-threatening
condition.”55 No matter what the implantable medical device is, once it is
connected to a network, it is essentially a node on the network that can be
seen, interacted with, and controlled.56 As these devices are increasingly
using wireless communications among components to improve health and
reporting, hackers have a larger avenue for control of a system.57
Unfortunately, the implanted medical devices already in patients
cannot just have cybersecurity protocols and software patched into them to
resolve this gaping security hole.58 The medical device industry in the
United States is tightly regulated by the FDA, which requires that the
50.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 176.
51.
Id.
52.
Wirth, supra note 26, at 27.
53.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36. In 2012, it was reported to the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Information Security and Privacy Advisory
Board that the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston was still using medical
devices that were using the original versions of Windows 95 and Windows XP, despite the
support for these ending in 2006 and 2010 respectively. Id. These devices were not even the
final patch of these versions, and were never upgraded to include any of the patches that came
out to these operating systems over the years. Id. This shows that, even if patching does
occur to devices, hospitals and medical professionals need to apply them in order to be
effective. See id.
54.
See Gollakota et al., supra note 5, at 3–4.
55.
Id.
56.
Robert J. Caruso & Melissa Masters, Applying Cyber Risk Management to
Medical Device Design, BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION & TECH., Spring 2014, at 32, 33.
57.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 176.
58.
Martha Vockley, Safe and Secure? Healthcare in the Cyberworld, 46
BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION & TECH. 164, 167 (2012).
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cybersecurity for any medical device and its upgrades be applied by the
manufacturer and not any person in the stream of commerce for the device.59
Therefore, a hospital cannot upgrade or add any type of cybersecurity to any
medical device without the manufacturer approving the upgrade.60 In
compliance with the FDA review process, a manufacturer needs to test the
proposed patch on the device, making sure the changes to the operating
system do not impact the behavior and functionality of the device.61 That
means that medical devices from a patch level are often “months, if not
years, behind where the operating system manufacturer is,” leading to a
security gap that cannot be remedied swiftly.62 When patches are approved
and finally applied, “they may require complex installation procedures and
acceptance testing” which may result in the patch not actually being
applied.63
Unlike in computers and other software, full automatic
distribution and application of upgrades are difficult to implement in
implantable medical devices because of the associated upgrade timing and
the system reboot endangering the patient; if there were an issue, the patient
would be vulnerable.64 Implantable medical devices can last up to ten years,
leaving the patients vulnerable to attack for a long time.65
The issue of patching and updating medical devices is not new, as it
has been widely recognized by the FDA as being an issue.66 The Department
of Homeland Security has also recognized this issue; for example, it reported
that the Conficker virus has not only been known to have infected
pacemakers through wireless and other connections but, also, cannot be
removed because removal of the virus would be considered a “modification
to the certified software” under governmental regulations.67
Implantable medical devices can also be infected with viruses or
targeted malware from networked devices.68 Any type of medical equipment
that is infected with a virus or malware and is connected to a network will
spread it to the implanted medical device.69 This can either give a hacker
control—if that is the target—or the ability to disable or slow down the
device.70 Many hospitals tend to get medical technology—devices and
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Wirth, supra note 26, at 27.
Id.
Vockley, supra note 58, at 167.
Id.
Wirth, supra note 26, at 28.
See id. at 32.
Gollakota et al., supra note 5, at 2.
Wirth, supra note 26, at 28.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 2.2.
Vockley, supra note 58, at 167.
Id.
See Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 161; Vockley, supra note 58, at 167.
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equipment—from a single vendor, and vendors tend to keep all of their
“equipment on the same patch or configuration level,” which makes the
spread of the virus or malware very easy. 71 Even if a hospital purchased
medical technology and devices from multiple vendors, having different
devices from different manufacturers, each with its own structure and
potential levels of security, would create an insecure tangled digital web of
cybersecurity.72 Targeted malware can move between different devices and
systems passively until it reaches the implantable medical device where it is
designed to activate.73 Due to the fact that implantable “medical devices
such as pacemakers [each] have [a] unique identifier[],” it is possible to
target a specific individual or class of people.74 This Internet of things that
connects physical equipment all together on a network via computers has
created many different avenues for cyberattacks.75
C.

National Security Risk

Concerns about the varying lapses in cybersecurity in implantable
medical devices and medical devices on the same network have merit.76
“Between . . . 2009 and . . . 2011, the [Department of Veterans’ Affairs]
detected 142 . . . instances of malware infections affecting 207 medical
devices found in [fourteen different parts of hospitals].”77 In one instance, in
the catheterization lab, the malware infection of equipment was so severe
that it “required transport of [the] patients to a different hospital.”78 In 2010,
a Veterans’ Affairs catheterization laboratory in New Jersey was closed due
to malware that infected hundreds of medical devices and computers on that
network.79 “[T]he Conficker worm [caused] . . . approximately 10[%] of the
[healthcare] IT infrastructure in Sweden” to go dark in 2010.80 That same
year, the same worm took “15[%] of New Zealand’s [total healthcare]
system . . . offline.”81 These kinds of viruses that can take over computers

71.
Vockley, supra note 58, at 167.
72.
Id.
73.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 2.2.
74.
Id.
75.
Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
76.
See Mankovich, supra note 7, at 174; Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36;
Daniel B. Kramer et al., Security and Privacy Qualities of Medical Devices: An Analysis of
FDA Postmarket Surveillance, PLOS ONE, July 19, 2012, at 1, 4.
77.
Kramer et al., supra note 76, at 4.
78.
Id.
79.
See Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36.
80.
Mankovich, supra note 7, at 174.
81.
Id.
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and devices are not bound by country borders and infect anything that links
into the network.82
In addition, there is a real danger of implementing already existing
safety measures, such as anti-virus software, in implantable medical
devices.83 “On April 21, 2010, one-third of the hospitals in Rhode Island
were forced to” stop elective surgeries and treatment of non-trauma patients
in the emergency room because the “anti-virus software update had . . .
misclassified a critical Windows [dynamic link library] as malicious.”84
Another example occurred when a “tornado hit St. John’s hospital in Kansas
City in May 2011.”85 The tornado “caus[ed] the electricity to go out, [and as
a result] doctors and nurses lost access to . . . vital medicine[] in the
[emergency room] and in [almost] every other department,” because the
drugs were in a powered metal cabinet which had an automatic lock
controlled by software.86
“Researchers at [the] Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, . . . have demonstrated [in a
laboratory] that it is possible to hack into wireless implantable medical
devices,” including pacemakers, heart defibrillators, insulin pumps, and even
cochlear implants and neurostimulators, and take control of them to the
detriment of patients.87 Even a programmable radio could control an
implantable defibrillator or an insulin pump by replaying messages, allowing
the operator of the radio to stop the device or to cause it to kill the host.88
Researcher Jerome Radcliffe inspected the Java-based configuration program
in his own insulin pump and was able to “reverse-engineer[] the pump’s
packet structure, revealing that [it did not] encrypt the medical data . . . or . . .
authenticate [when] the components [of the insulin pump communicated] to
one another.”89 A researcher with Radcliffe also demonstrated his ability to
take over and shut down a volunteer’s insulin pump, showing how easy and
swiftly it could be done.90 To further the point, a group of researchers
demonstrated how “analog signal injection of low-frequency waveforms . . .
on the sensing leads of” an implantable defibrillator could be tricked by
crafting electromagnetic interference waveforms to deliver a defibrillation
shock.91 This means that even an attacker who cannot perfectly match an
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 174–75.
See Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36.
Id.
Klein & Kagan, supra note 29, at 2.
Id.
Vockley, supra note 58, at 170.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 161.
Id.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 166.
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electromagnetic interference signal’s wavelength to the length of the sensing
leads could just increase the power to override and trigger the implantable
medical device.92 Researchers have not only been able to do something once
thought of as science fiction in a laboratory, but they have also been able to
do it in the course of a live demonstration.93
III.

CURRENT STATE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

The FDA’s mission is to protect “the public health by assuring the
safety, efficacy, and security of medical devices.”94 The FDA regulates
medical devices and approves them, but its authority is in flux regarding
regulation of cybersecurity.95 Part A of this Section delves into the FDA and
its numerous attempts to tackle cybersecurity of implantable medical devices
through voluntary guidance, regulations, and proposed regulations.96 Part B
examines various congressional attempts to tackle cybersecurity of
implantable medical devices, along with other governmental bodies such as
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense, and the White House.97 This Section
highlights the contradictory nature of all of the various governmental bodies’
solutions to the important issue of cybersecurity in implantable medical
devices.98
A.

The Power of the FDA

The FDA classifies a device as an “instrument, . . . machine, . . .
implant, . . . or other similar . . . article, including any component, part, or
accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in
man or other animals.”99 The FDA subjects all of these to the same laws and
standards, with a definition that is vague enough that even a smartphone
becomes a medical device when employing a cell phone camera to determine
urine analytes.100 “The FDA considers [most] [h]ealth IT products to be
‘similar or related to’ other medical device products,” which results in the
92.
See id.
93.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 164.
94.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36.
95.
See Vockley, supra note 58, at 166–67.
96.
See infra Section III.A.
97.
See infra Section III.B.
98.
See infra Section III.B.
99.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (2012).
100.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LETTER TO BIOSENSE TECHNOLOGIES
PRIVATE LIMITED CONCERNING THE UCHECK URINE ANALYZER (2013).
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FDA classifications referring back to themselves in defining medical devices
and standards.101
The FDA has released numerous guidance documents on
cybersecurity throughout the years, all echoing each other with no actual
effect on implantable medical devices.102 “In 2005, the [FDA] issued [a]
‘Guidance for Industry—Cybersecurity for Networked Medical Devices
Containing Off-the-Shelf Software,’” which stated that it was “the
responsibility of medical device manufacturers to maintain cybersecurity”
and to keep them safe and effective through maintenance plans for its
cybersecurity.103 “On September 25, 2013, the FDA [released the] Mobile
Medical Applications Guidance . . . (“MMA Guidance”),” which declared
that it “intend[ed] to regulate software that poses significant risks to patients .
. . .”104 The MMA Guidance also explained that devices classified as
“[mobile medical applications] must have premarket approval or clearance
[from the FDA] before commercialization may begin.”105 The MMA
Guidance also defined “[a] manufacturer as [being] anyone who ‘creates,
designs, develops, labels, re-labels, . . . modifies, or creates a software
system or application for a regulated medical device in whole or from
multiple software components.’”106 This software classification sweeps in all
types of medical devices, including smartphones, although Congress has
stated that the FDA does not have authority to do so.107
To further complicate things, in February 2011, the FDA reclassified
its Medical Device Data Systems (“MDDS”) rule from a Class III, highest
risk, to a Class I, lowest risk classification.108 This MDDS rule defines
MDDS as devices intended to transfer, store, and convert from one format to
another or display medical device data.109 Implantable medical devices fall
101.
Areta L. Kupchyk, What’s Trending with Mobile Medical Apps and
Health IT? A New FDA Regulatory Framework May Be in the Making, 6 HEALTH IT L. &
INDUSTRY REP. 1, 2 (2014); see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
102.
See Mankovich, supra note 7, at 175; Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2–3.
103.
Mankovich, supra note 7, at 175; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
CYBERSECURITY FOR NETWORKED MEDICAL DEVICES CONTAINING OFF-THE-SHELF (OTS)
SOFTWARE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2005).
104.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2–3; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2015).
105.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 104.
106.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 3; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 104.
107.
See Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 5.
108.
See 21 C.F.R. § 880.6310(b) (2016); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 104.
109.
21 C.F.R. § 880.6310(a)(1)(i)–(iv).
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within this classification.110 Under the new MDDS rule classification, the
FDA does not consider “software that is critical to keeping a patient alive,
such as blood pressure cuffs and glucose monitors, to be [a] MDDS
product[].”111 The FDA determined that the new classification to lowest risk
is because these products pose the lowest risk to the patient, and the controls
of the devices “would provide . . . reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness.”112
Under this new classification, which incorporates
implantable medical devices, “[m]anufacturers are only required to comply
with the registration and listing requirements, the Medical Device Reporting
regulation . . . and the Quality System Regulation” of the FDA.113
The FDA has numerous proposals in the works as well.114 First, the
“FDA has proposed to expand the types of . . . device[s] . . . [under the
MDDS Rule] that would be exempt from FDA enforcement.”115 The FDA
also plans “to revise its [MMA Guidance] to conform [to] the MDDS
expansion and clarify the types of mobile medical [applications] that would
be exempt from FDA enforcement as a medical device.”116 “The FDA [also]
has proposed not to enforce compliance with any regulatory controls that
apply to the MDDS;” “medical image storage device[s], [which provide]
electronic storage and retrieval functions for medical images;” and “medical
image communication device[s], [which are] device[s] that provide
electronic transfer of medical image data between medical devices,” “based
on a determination that these devices pose low risk to patient safety.”117 The
language of the proposal, however, is vague enough to incorporate
implantable medical devices such as insulin pumps.118 Lastly, the FDA
published the Health Information Technology (“HIT”) Report at the request
of Congress in April 2014, in accordance with the Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (“FDASIA”), which proposed
another strategy based on classifying healthcare intellectual technology
products.119 The recommended categories were administrative products,
health management products, and medical devices.120 This report led to

note 104.
note 104.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.; Gupta, supra note 22.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 3.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 3; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra

117.

Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 4; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra

118.
119.
120.

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 104.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2, 4.
Id. at 4.
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proposed legislation based on a function-based framework when evaluating
applications and products, and it does not address medical software or have
any binding authority.121
The FDA came out with a new series of nonbinding
recommendations in October 2014, after an investigation by the Department
of Homeland Security into the cybersecurity of implantable medical devices
was made public.122 This new guidance began by recognizing “[t]he need for
effective cybersecurity to assure medical device functionality and safety [in
light of] increasing use of wireless, Internet, and network connect[ive]
devices.”123 The FDA recognized the threat stemming from failure to
maintain cybersecurity in these devices, including the possibility that
compromising medical devices could cause harm and death to patients.124
The FDA’s nonbinding recommendations [were] modeled on the [National
Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”)] Cybersecurity
Framework,” recommended by the White House, and it “encourages
manufacturers to develop controls to ensure the security of medical devices”
in the Internet of things.125 It also “encourages manufacturers to treat
[cybersecurity] as a fundamental part of the development[] process” and
“acknowledge[s] that device makers face [the] challenge[] [of] striking the
balance between . . . cybersecurity” and making sure the device itself would
remain usable.126 “The FDA also recommends that manufacturers includ[e]
certain documentation as part of the premarket submission process to ensure
implementation of appropriate cybersecurity controls.”127
That
“documentation includes a hazard analysis, a summary of [the] controls, and
a traceability matrix that ‘links actual cybersecurity . . . to the . . . risks that
were considered.’”128 The FDA guidance documents for software, however,
121.
122.

Id. at 2, 4.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR
MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2014); see also Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks:
DHS Investigates At-Risk Devices, KING & SPALDING 2 (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca102714a.pdf.
123.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
124.
Id.
125.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 2; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122. The Internet of
things is a term that describes all devices with the capability of connecting to the Internet,
other devices, or other networks. See Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS
Investigates At-Risk Devices, supra note 122, at 2; Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
126.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 2; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
127.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 2.
Id.
128.
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generally always focus on “large-scale computer-based equipment [and] not
computerized devices,” with focus on data security and not safety.129 All of
these are purely recommendations with no binding authority.130
On December 28, 2016, the FDA published its final guidance for the
Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices.131 The
guidance states repeatedly that it in no way “establishes any rights . . . and it
is not binding on [the] FDA or the public.”132 The FDA emphasizes “that
manufacturers should monitor, identify, and address cybersecurity
vulnerabilities and exploits as part of their postmarket management of [the]
medical devices.”133 In an effort to streamline this process, the FDA states
that it does not intend to enforce its own reporting requirements for device
patches.134 The FDA’s rationale is that “cybersecurity . . . updates and
patches are generally considered to be a type of device enhancement for
which the FDA does not require advance notification or reporting.”135
However, should a cybersecurity vulnerability or exploit “pose a risk to
health,” the medical device manufacturer would be required to report this to
the FDA.136 Beyond finding a risk to health, the FDA also recommends that
manufacturers use a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tool in
determining the probability of the occurrence of harm for a device, as well as
for assessing the severity of harm to the patient.137 The rest of the December
2016 guidance echoes the other FDA rules and regulations, particularly the
October guidance in terms of cybersecurity practice.138 The changes to the
patching of medical devices in this guidance are non-binding and unclear as

129.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 1; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
supra note 122.
130.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 2; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
131.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2016).
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id. (quoting U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122).
136.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131. While a medical device
manufacturer would be required to report a cybersecurity vulnerability or exploit that “pose[s]
a risk to health,” it is unknown under the Guidance when the notification would occur, or if
the device manufacturer would be punished for patching the exploit before notification and
approval by the FDA. Id.
137.
Id.
138.
See id.; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
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to when reporting to the FDA would be necessary for health risk
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in medical devices.139
The recent FDA regulations do not put forth any new ideas.140 The
FDA created “a cross-agency working group [as long ago as 2013] involving
. . . the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology and the Federal Communications Commission,” which called for
recommendations and a risk-based regulatory framework but did not define
what that meant.141 In addition, the FDA also has recommended in the past
that manufacturers provide “[a] specific list of all cybersecurity risks that
were considered in the design of [the] device,” controls for the device, and a
plan for providing updates along the device lifecycle.142 The working group
also recommended that manufacturers send “[a]ppropriate documentation to
demonstrate that the device will . . . [arrive] free of malware,” include in the
device instructions what kind of anti-virus software or firewall is on the
device, if any, and that the manufacturers anticipate and include in the
instructions whether a particular type of user will put their own anti-virus
software on the device.143 This is contrary to the FDA 510(k) certification
process, which requires manufacturers to be the sole party to upgrade the
device and to send the patch to the FDA for approval before it goes into
effect.144 There are so many FDA regulations and recommendations that are
vague and contradictory to one another that something must be done to
clarify this bureaucratic mess and establish a standard for cybersecurity of
implantable medical devices.145
B.

Governmental Reclassifications, Power Shifts, and Executive Orders

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
pervasively regulates electronic health information through its privacy and
security rules, but HIPAA focuses on data security rather than device
139.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 122.
140.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; Fu & Blum, supra note
40, at 36; Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
141.
Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
142.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 37.
143.
Id.
144.
See Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 162.
145.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; Wirth, supra note 26, at
27–28. While the agency itself has a process of reviewing and approving upgrades, the FDA
itself recommends that manufacturers anticipate users putting on cybersecurity, which is
contradictory to establishing any sort of standard for the device and help against the FDA’s
own regulations. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; Wirth, supra note 26, at
27–28. The agency has been so malleable on this issue that it contradicts itself. See U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; Wirth, supra note 26, at 27–28.
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Congress defined security under HIPAA as “physically
security.146
protecting health information stored or transmitted electronically,” thus,
failing to include cybersecurity of medical devices against hackers who want
to control the device.147 Congress passed the FDASIA, which delves into
levels of medical device classification for federal protection and addresses
which type of FDA scrutiny they each undergo.148 The FDASIA requires the
FDA to propose a strategy and recommends it on “an appropriate risk based
regulatory framework focused on functionality for Health IT.”149 In April
2014, the FDA published the HIT Report, which suggested a function-based
framework companies could refer to, but it did not address the
“multifunctional nature of medical software.”150 Overall, the FDASIA and
the HIT Report attempted to reclassify certain aspects of medical technology
and devices, but that was not a strong attempt at a solution, at least in part
because Congress designated the HIT Report, which it petitioned the FDA to
issue as having no authority.151
“As the FDA was completing the HIT Report [at the request of
Congress], a bipartisan congressional coalition introduced the Sensible
Oversight for Technology, which Advances Regulatory Efficiency Act of
2013 (“SOFTWARE Act”) . . . .”152 Just like the FDASIA, the SOFTWARE
Act is another reclassification of medical device products under three
different categories at the FDA.153 However, the FDA would only have
jurisdiction to regulate under one of the categories.154 Clinical and health
software, including software that analyzes and changes patient data, would
be exempt from regulation.155
The United States Consumer Product Safety Administration has
oversight of software vulnerabilities where the FDA does not, despite the
FDA having the oversight of the medical devices that host the software.156
However, the United States Consumer Product Safety Administration does
not cover computer security on vulnerability assessments of software.157

146.
R.L. Garrie & P.E. Paustian, mHealth Regulation, Legislation, and
Cybersecurity, in MHEALTH: TRANSFORMING HEALTHCARE 45, 46 (2014).
147.
Id.
148.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
See id. at 2, 4.
152.
Id. at 2.
153.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2, 4.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 3.3.
157.
Id.
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This is just proposed legislation and another contradictory attempt at
reclassification from Congress.158
The Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology
Act of 2014 (“PROTECT Act”) is another proposed law, again attempting to
reclassify medical devices within the FDA.159 The PROTECT Act was a
congressional response to the FDA’s failure to respond to questions from the
Health IT industry.160 The congressional purpose of the PROTECT Act is to
prevent FDA overregulation while protecting innovation and exempting lowrisk health software from a new tax under the Affordable Care Act.161 This
is another attempt by Congress to reclassify medical devices, further
muddying efforts to identify medical devices and implement protection at a
federally consistent level.162
The FTC is also influencing the medical device field, as the devices
use wireless frequencies available in the open air.163 The data transmitted
from these devices could be used and stolen as a result from cyberattacks,
and this crosses over into the FTC’s administrative realm.164 The FTC issued
an order in GMR Transcription Services, Inc., stating that the cybersecurity
issue of medical records on devices that they have are poorly defined.165 The
FTC then ordered GMR Transcription Services to have its security looked at
and inspected for a set number of years, in order to make sure they were
doing something with cybersecurity.166 This demonstrates another agency
recognizing the issue of poor cybersecurity and issuing compliance check-ins
to make sure that some level of cybersecurity is achieved.167
In an executive order, President Obama issued the NIST Framework
in 2013, which was designed to improve cybersecurity practices across all
critical United States sectors vulnerable to cyberattack.168 The executive
order required the “NIST, a division of the Department of Commerce, to
develop a [set] . . . of voluntary cybersecurity best practices for [United
States] critical infrastructure sectors.”169 That framework would provide an
entity with an understanding of where each critical United States sector is in
158.
See id.; Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2, 4.
159.
See Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2.
160.
Id. at 5.
161.
Id.
162.
See id.
163.
See Alex Ruoff, supra note 37, at 20.
164.
See id.
165.
See id.
166.
Id. at 3–5.
167.
See id. at 4.
168.
Alex Ruoff, Federal Security Officials Say Cyberattacks on Health
Companies Expected to Increase, 23 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1282, 1282 (2014).
169.
Id.
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terms of vulnerability and attempt to analyze each level of security.170 The
NIST Framework analyzes the usefulness of controls to a particular device in
three separate areas of cybersecurity—confidentiality, integrity, and
availability—and sets control levels per device for risk assessment.171 If an
area is classified as high risk, the framework determines what controls need
to be implemented to try to mitigate that risk.172 This is another voluntary
measure that brings in another agency, along with another reclassification,
separated from the many that Congress and the FDA have, which makes
having any cohesive protection of implantable medical devices’
cybersecurity that much more complicated.173
Adding another layer of complexity, during the George W. Bush
administration, the Department of Homeland Security was involved in trying
to tackle the issue of cybersecurity of implantable medical devices.174 The
Bush Administration formed a private-sector group in partnership with the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human
Services, to convince the healthcare industry to conform to the Bush
Administration’s “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.”175 This group
ended up finding that nobody knows the condition of the healthcare sector’s
collective security infrastructure, since the industry is fragmented, and each
institution gauges its cybersecurity and its vulnerabilities differently.176 The
group recommended raising the bar for manufacturers, “possibly by
establishing [a] minimum-security standard[] for certain products and . . .
[even] creating a certification process for [cybersecurity].”177 Finally, the
group recommended devising a standardizing tool to help assess
vulnerabilities for manufacturers, something that is still repeatedly
mentioned over a decade later.178
In October 2014, the Department of Homeland Security revealed an
investigation of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in medical devices and hospital
equipment that may be exploitable by cyber criminals and are susceptible to
malicious hacking.179 The vulnerabilities investigated could cause severe
injury and death; they were found in implantable medical devices including

170.
See id.
171.
Caruso & Masters, supra note 56, at 32.
172.
See id.
173.
See id.; Ruoff, supra note 168, at 1282.
174.
See Colias, supra note 4, at 62.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 64.
178.
See id.
179.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 1.
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infusion pumps and implantable heart devices.180 The Department, however,
stated that the probe started when a deceased cybersecurity expert, Barnaby
Jack, demonstrated in 2012 that he could hack wireless communications and
remotely cause an implanted pacemaker to deliver a lethal shock to the
host.181 In response, the Department of Homeland Security said it had been
“working with . . . manufacturers to identify and repair” the issues in the
software of the implantable medical devices “that would allow . . . [hackers]
to take control of them.”182
In contrast to all these ambiguous regulations, proposals, executive
orders, legislation, and proposed legislation, the Department of Defense has a
very strict policy for all devices that the military uses.183 The “Department
of Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process
program mandates strict certification requirements for [all] . . . computer
systems” provided for the military, including hospital equipment and medical
devices of all kinds.184 In order for these devices to be sold to the
Department of Defense, they must meet a strict security certification.185 This
has caused problems, as most manufacturers are not willing or even capable
of bearing the financial cost necessary of meeting the standards due to the
size of the market.186
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In all, at least five agencies have indicated intent to regulate
cybersecurity in medical devices, but nothing is clear and concrete, and what
exists is overlapping, confusing, and contradictory.187 The private sector
recognizes the need for an enforceable system pursuant to which medical
devices can be tested on a baseline of cybersecurity standards through the
FDA.188 The nature of the medical industry, comprised of both private and
public entities, requires a willingness to unify to address cybersecurity at a
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 1–2.
182.
Jai Vijayan, DHS Investigates Dozens of Medical Device Cybersecurity
Flaws,
INFORMATIONWEEK
(Oct.
23,
2014,
9:06
AM),
http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/security-and-privacy/dhs-investigates-dozens-ofmedical-device-cybersecurity-flaws-/d/d-id/1316882.
183.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 4.3.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
See Mathias Klümper & Erik Vollebregt, Navigating the New EU Rules
for Medical Device Software, 2009 REG. AFF. J. DEVICES, 83, 83; Ruoff, supra note 168;
Ruoff, supra note 37.
188.
Homeland Security Investigating Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra
note 1; Ruoff, supra note 33.
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consistent level nationwide.189 This can be achieved by combining the
strengths of the federal government—homeland security and public safety—
with the innovative ability of the private sector to tackle cybersecurity for
implantable medical devices.190 This is important, for knowledge of the
technological domain specific to implantable medical devices needs to be
coupled with the regulation if it is to be strong and not a hindrance to the
medical devices’ purpose.191 Just as the federal government and its agencies
have developed ways to detect, track, identify risks, and prevent and combat
epidemics with the help of the private sector, so too can the government, to
an extent, do the same thing to mitigate the harm that can result from the
vulnerabilities in implantable medical devices.192 Standards are useful in
creating secure products, as they can help a manufacturer ensure that all
known issues have been considered, and this is especially important in very
complex devices such as implantable medical devices.193 Part A discusses
possible federal solutions to clearing up the bureaucratic confusion among all
of the various governmental bodies.194 Part B explores various private sector
solutions, including traditional and nontraditional solutions to tackling
cybersecurity in implantable medical devices.195 This also includes some
potential private regulation.196 Some persuasive examples emanate from the
European Union (“EU”) and an international standards body, both of which
have attempted to secure implantable medical devices.197 Lastly, Part C
warns of the dangers of poorly drafted regulations in this area, highlighting
how bad regulation can both compromise the user of an implantable medical
device and harm the medical device industry.198
A.

Governmental Solutions

Governmental solutions in the United States could vary greatly. One
absolutely necessary step is for the agencies to collaborate on a set of
universal definitions.199 There are classifications that Congress, the FDA,
189.
Barnett et al., supra note 34, at 43.
190.
Id.
191.
See Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
192.
Id. at 397.
193.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 2.1.5.
194.
See Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 1; infra Section IV.A.
195.
Vijayan, supra note 182; see also Kramer et al., supra note 76, at 4; infra
Section IV.B.
196.
See Vijayan, supra note 182.
197.
Klümper & Vollebregt, supra note 187, at 83–84.
198.
See Kramer et al., supra note 76, at 4; infra Section IV.C.
199.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
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the White House, and the other agencies must clarify, with the first step
being the use of universal definitions.200 “[M]edical applications can be of
two types: [W]earable and implanted. Wearable devices are those that can
be used on [the] body surface of a human or [in] close proximity [to] the
user,” such as, a heart rate monitor, blood pressure monitor, and glucose
sensor.201 Implantable medical devices, on the other hand, “are those
[devices] that are inserted inside [the] human body,” such as, an implantable
defibrillator and insulin pump.202 Having clear, non-ambiguous definitions
used by all agencies, whether the list appears in legislation or regulations,
would help alleviate some of the confusion.
Another solution would be to expand HIPAA to give the Department
of Health and Human Services power over cybersecurity issues in this realm
and teeth to enforce the new regulations.203 The Department of Health and
Human Services Office for Civil Rights estimates that 66% of providers have
not complied with the HIPAA-mandated audit of security controls for their
electronic health records.204 Organizations generally “wait until an attack or
breach has occurred to perform an audit,” and apparently are willing to take
the risk of incurring civil monetary penalties imposed for noncompliance
with HIPAA.205 Even if organizations complied with HIPAA, most of the
HIPAA protection relies on standard methods of isolating critical data, which
is bypassed by attackers when taking over or overloading an implantable
medical device.206 A possible solution would be to give HIPAA coverage of
cybersecurity of devices and put power into the enforcement of its provisions
for cybersecurity.
The FDA has already recommended a set of regulatory
improvements.207 The October FDA Guidance included recommendations
that would help to address the cybersecurity issues if they were implemented
as requirements in a regulation on implantable medical devices.208 Starting
with the premarket submission process to the FDA, demonstrating the
existence of a hazard analysis, a summary of controls, and a traceability
matrix that links actual controls to the cybersecurity risks foreseen by the
manufacturer would ensure that devices incorporate some sort of
200.
See id.
201.
Moshaddique Al Ameen et al., Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless
Sensor Networks for Healthcare Applications, 36 J. MED. SYSTEMS 93, 93 (2012).
202.
Id.
203.
See Ruoff, supra note 37, at 20.
204.
Ruoff, supra note 168, at 1282.
205.
Id.
206.
Perakslis, supra note 39, at 395–96.
207.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
208.
Id.; see also Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates
At-Risk Devices, supra note 122, at 2.
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cybersecurity precautions.209 “Manufacturers should address cybersecurity
during the design and development of the medical device,” with a
vulnerability and management approach for the life of the device.210 Due to
the longevity of implantable medical devices, it is important that a
cybersecurity plan—from the beginning—is in place, instead of being
reactionary and doing ad hoc fixes once problems occur.211 This can be
coupled with the “software validation and risk analysis” that is already
required for certification of an implantable medical device by the FDA.212
The cybersecurity and vulnerability approach should assess threats
and vulnerabilities, mitigation strategies, risk, and accepted risk.213 It should
also balance the safeguards that the manufacturer decides to put in place, to
make them appropriate to the user and location of use, so that security
controls will not hinder access in an emergency situation.214 There should
also be features in implantable medical devices that recognize and detect
breaches, log them, and act on them during normal use, as well as have a
failsafe mode for when the device is compromised, so that the critical
functionality is still protected.215 The current language is only persuasive
and suggestively vague to consider all devices; yet, having it as a pre-market
approval requirement would force manufacturers and the FDA to take
cybersecurity into account as part of the FDA approval process.216
B.

Other Solutions

The private sector also has recommendations on ways to implement
a national cybersecurity standard.217 One is to certify third-party testers to
test security vulnerabilities in devices.218 Another is a national information
sharing system for medical device cybersecurity to detect the latest security
vulnerabilities and tackle them.219 This, coupled with a federal safe harbor
provision for reporting cybersecurity breaches of medical devices, would
allow a clearer picture of the state of cybersecurity of the devices and allow
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new cybersecurity issues to be addressed.220 “[A]ctive and real-time
surveillance and communication of emerging cyberthreats” can only help in
securing all implantable medical devices.221 While there is an inherent
perceived danger to knowing and reporting cybersecurity of devices, security
experts have long stated that secret cybersecurity protocols are commonly
reversed engineered and easily defeated.222 A better method of security is to
have a system that is completely open to critique, thus making it more secure
across the board.223 This follows “[a] fundamental tenant of cryptography . .
. known as Kerckhoffs’ principle,” which states that a system “should be
secure even if the adversary knows everything about the system except its
key.”224 By choosing a system that is in the public, the community as a
whole only strengthens the end product’s security by working on it
together.225
A Host Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (“HIDS/HIPS”)
is another means of protecting implantable medical devices.226 HIDS/HIPS,
“technologies are based on managing a known behavior of a system,” and
preventing any unknown behavior from happening or taking over.227 This
kind of system would work well in implantable medical devices because it
provides strong protection against attacks that have never occurred before.228
However, there is always the possibility of a HIDS/HIPS preventing critical
support from the device, and it can be tricked by a hacker.229 Despite this, a
HIDS/HIPS addresses some concerns for cybersecurity of implantable
medical devices and warrants further exploration of implementation in
implantable medical devices.230
There are other means to address cybersecurity concerns of
implantable medical devices outside of conventional cybersecurity
methods.231 One involves “tattooing the encryption key” to an encrypted
implantable medical device on the patient in an “invisible, UV-light-readable
ink” for emergency situations.232 Along the same vein of modifying the user
for added cybersecurity protection is one type of cybersecurity control, tested
220.
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in a pacemaker, that allows access in emergency situations to medical
personnel by connecting to a computer and using the patient’s heartbeat as
authorization for commands by an external system.233 This, however, defeats
the purpose of a wireless implantable medical device, and it would require
surgery to access the internal medical device, putting the patient at risk. 234
Another option is a subcutaneous push switch that would be implanted under
the skin of the patient for the purpose of reprogramming the device and
allowing access, thus, allowing emergency personnel to be able to be reset in
a failsafe mode.235 Additionally, RF-shielding wearable pouches can
accompany the patient, which would restrict the wireless communication of
the implantable medical device to millimeters and require a security token to
access.236 Lastly, a standardizing score that applies to a device that answers
in a satisfies/does not satisfy evaluation for each aspect of the device can be
used to evaluate whether or not a device meets a certain score, which would
determine whether it should be marketed.237 While a high score in this area
could be used by medical device manufacturers to promote their products as
a new type of marketing edge over competitors, it trivializes cybersecurity
and is not focused enough towards tackling specific issues.238 If this system
was coupled with suggestive FDA regulations, however, it could prove to be
a general solution.239
Lastly, the United States can look towards the EU as a guidepost for
how to approach cybersecurity in medical device software.240 In Directive
2007/47/EC, the EU imposed stricter rules on software used with medical
devices, although it only applies to software that directly controls the
device.241 The directive makes it so that all software is updated, validated,
and approved from an authoritative agency, and does not change the risk
classification of the device.242 While this echoes what the FDA already does
to an extent, the fact that it specifically covers and classifies the software of
the medical device should be taken into consideration.243 Additionally, the
EU conducted a cybersecurity “exercise involving 29 countries and 200
233.
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agencies deal[ing] with attack scenarios against critical infrastructure[s],”
which included hospitals and hacking into medical devices.244 As the EU
Commission Vice President stated, “[t]he sophistication and volume of
cyberattacks are increasing every day. . . . They cannot be countered if
individual states work alone or just a handful of them act together.”245
Outside of the EU, international standards bodies, such as the Association for
the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation, have formed working groups
and issued standards on medical device security that include manufacturers
and regulators.246 Regardless of whether the United States follows the EU or
an international standardizing body, international harmonization of
cybersecurity is almost inevitable due to the nature of the Internet.247
C.

Dangers with Governmental Regulation

There are dangers with increased regulations that must be
considered.248 Regulations can become burdensome to technological
advancement, with Congress—or any executive administrative body—failing
to take into account the concerns of the healthcare industry and the
knowledge of how to make a device that would not harm a patient by
running slowly when implementing the regulations.249 The industry itself
must understand the capital and operating costs of implementing a
cybersecurity system and factor that in, or else face potential inept and
burdensome regulations.250
The FDA Guidance also recommends that manufacturers consider
implementing things like authentication protocols, automatic timers to
terminate connections with a device after a period of time, placing physical
locks on the devices, and making stronger passwords to the devices.251 It
also recommends a layered user authentication procedure and restriction of
updates, allowing users to download and update their own software and
244.
EU Holds Largest-Ever Cyber-Security Exercise, Defense of Critical
Infrastructure
the
Focus,
FOX
NEWS
(Oct.
31,
2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/10/31/eu-holds-largest-ever-cyber-security-exercisedefense-critical-infrastructure/.html.
245.
Id.
246.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 37.
247.
See id.
248.
See Robert Mittman & Mary Cain, The Future of the Internet in

Healthcare:
A Five-Year Forecast, in THE INTERNET AND HEALTH
COMMUNICATION: EXPERIENCES AND EXPECTATIONS 47, 55 (Ronald E. Rice &
James E. Katz eds., 2001).
249.
250.
251.

See id. at 55.
Id. at 55.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122, at 5.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss3/7

26

Woods: Cardiac Defibrillators Need To Have A Bulletproof Vest: The Natio

2017]

CARDIAC DEFIBRILLATORS

445

firmware from the manufacturer.252 These recommendations, however, have
already been considered to be dangerous by medical device manufacturers
and have been proven to be harmful in locking out medical personnel in an
emergency to a patient.253 Many good cybersecurity requirements, in fact,
conflict with the need for emergency access to a device.254 Additionally,
requiring implantable medical devices to incorporate certain software can
have a major impact on the battery life of the device, reducing the longevity
of the device and causing other potential issues.255 This carries over into the
plain fact that there are different levels of severity of vulnerabilities in
implantable medical devices.256 For example, a cardiac defibrillator can kill
its user, while a non-actuating glucose sensor cannot do lethal damage on its
own.257 This danger must be taken into consideration when making any sort
of regulations for implantable medical devices.258
Another regulatory concern is that there are usually compromises
that specifically exclude certain areas from needing to be secured in making
any regulation.259 One example is “the NERC-CIP cybersecurity standard
for the North American bulk power system,” which specifically excludes
non-routable protocols and narrowly defines devices considered critical
assets bound by the regulatory standards.260 Organizations typically do the
minimum to meet regulatory compliance, which means excluding some
areas, which would highlight weak areas for attackers to gain access.261 Due
to this practice, numerous people in the medical industry and the government
are concerned that if standards are written and enforced, they may actually
undermine the purpose of trying to protect the user of the implantable
medical device.262
Finally, of course, increased regulation of certain medical devices
can lead to an increase in the cost of certification and testing of the devices
themselves.263 An example is in the aviation industry, “where over 50% of
the resources required to develop new, safety critical systems” are used in
252.
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just certifying the system.264 For medical devices and cybersecurity, much of
the hardware and software are still incapable of being reliant due to the need
for more advanced and integrated technology, as current widely used
techniques and protocols are inappropriate for the confined space of an
implantable medical device.265 The right balance needs to be found in
regulation to establish security without creating expensive and complicated
standards that are contradictory in nature.266 Legislation and regulation can
facilitate increasing cybersecurity through base guidelines for implantable
medical devices, but they can also harm patients if they fail to take into
account industry knowledge and dangers.267
V.

CONCLUSION

Hackers have turned from hacking businesses and governments for
fame and fortune to covert organized cybercrime, which is estimated to be
exceeding the illegal drug trafficking trade.268 It is dangerously naïve for the
federal government and medical device manufacturers to fail to understand
that “many individuals . . . are highly intelligent, skilled, and motivated” to
find and exploit weaknesses in medical devices.269 These devices were “‘not
designed to withstand terrorist attacks. . . . ‘Permitting control of a
component in a human body without authentication seems grossly negligent,
and should raise the ire of the FDA.’”270 Former Secretary of Defense, Leon
Panetta, was correct in stating that an organized attack focused on
vulnerabilities of implantable medical devices “could be a cyber Pearl
Harbor, an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of
life.”271
The problem facing implantable medical device manufacturers is
complex, requiring a balance of usability, performance, and safety, while
taking into consideration the cybersecurity threats of a growing digitally
connected world.272 Without a standardized baseline for specifications, the
interconnectivity of every medical device will negate some security features
of others and create opportunities for attacks.273 The “healthcare industry
needs to . . . [become] involved in [the current] legislative process [on
264.
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implantable medical devices] or risk the imposition of . . . regulations” that
can harm the product through unintended consequences and hinder the
technological growth of implantable medical devices.274
The threat of cyberattacks is a clear and present danger, and it is time
to focus on ways to protect the user from a technology that can be altered
remotely to be a weapon instead of a significant life-changing tool.275 It is
up to key players—the “[p]roviders, manufacturers, security experts, industry
organiz[ers], [and the government] . . . to work together to . . . protect [the]
integrated healthcare” industry that is becoming more connected with the
Internet every day.276
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